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Introduction for: 
COLEMAN 
Americans have always been somewhat skeptical of 
politicians and the government. A healthy skepticism helps keep 
the government accountable to the people and is a part of our 
political heritage. But in recent years, disillusion has 
replaced skepticism as people have come to doubt the honesty and 
ability of those in the government and other public institutions. 
No branch of government is free from this disenchantment. 
Attention to scandals like Watergate and Iran-Contra have 
redefined the way Americans view the President. For generations 
of Americans, the President was a man of integrity, someone to 
look up to. Recent generations no longer take the President's 
integrity for granted. The Savings and Loan Crisis and the House 
Bank check cashing scandal have damaged the peoples' perception 
of Congress as well. 
The sense of disillusion extends to the legal system as 
well. Several problems create the impression that the legal 
system can not deliver justice impartially. Court congestion, 
exacerbated by tight state and federal budgets, delays the 
hearing of cases for months, if not years. Plea bargains and 
other discretionary devices used to quickly move cases through 
the system attract negative publicity. Excessive discovery, 
uncooperative and combative attorneys, and dubrous billing 
practices have created the impression that the bar acts more in 
its own interest than that of justice. 
Most people who work in the legal system agree that reforms 
at all levels are needed. In his Sennett Lecture, William T. 
Coleman, Jr. starts at the top and examines proposals intended to 
remedy a longstanding problem facing the Supreme Court: its 
excessive caseload. As Mr. Coleman suggests, the Court's heavy 
caseload has repercussions that effect the entire legal system. 
Mr. Coleman fears that growth of the Court's caseload has reduced 
the quality of some of its opinions. Should this continue, Mr. 
Coleman warns, the Court's authority will erode and its role as 
the final arbiter of constitutional disputes will be discounted. 
Mr. Coleman's lecture reveals an interesting point: the 
Supreme ·court's role in the legal system is not static and has 
changed in subtle but important ways. Mr. Coleman combines his 
knowledge of historical efforts to reform the caseload with a 
well inf armed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of 
contemporary reform proposals. Unsatisfied with these proposals, 
Mr. Coleman uses his Sennett Lecture to make several of his own. 
Mr. Coleman's proposals are bold; they reflect his strongly held 
belief in the Court's preeminent role in protecting 
constitutional rights. 
Mr Coleman's lecture will encourage all who question the 
efficacy of the legal system. Mr. Coleman and the other Sennett 
Lecturers repeatedly prove that the best and brightest minds are 
hard at work to improve the institutions that have protected 
liberty and dispensed justice for more than two centuries. 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
MANAGING ITS CASELOAD TO ACHIEVE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSES 
WILLIAM T. COLEMAN, JR.* 
INTRODUCTION 
In his persistent and innovative efforts to improve the 
administration of justice, Chief Justice Burger has invited 
public debate about the effect of the Supreme Court's rising 
caseload on the quality of judicial decision-making. 1 Because 
Justice Holmes once reminded us that justice and high judicial 
performance require the company of the bench and the bar acting 
in concert, 2 commentary from a practicing member of the bar 
seems appropriate. Thus, in the spirit of the Chief Justice's 
invitation this Article will (1) discuss the Supreme Court's 
1 Chief Justice Burger, Annual Report on the State of the 
Judiciary, 69 AB. A J 442, 446 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 
Annual Report]. 
2 Address by Justice Holmes, Suffolk Bar Association Dinner 
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1 
excessive workload, (2) survey solutions that have been proposed, 
primarily by other Justices, and (3) suggest an alternative that 
may be more consistent with the Court's historic traditions and 
basic constitutional purpose. This issue transcends the workload 
question itself; it goes to the essence of the Supreme Court's 
responsibilities during the next two hundred years of our 
constitutional democracy. The solution chosen will affect the 
quality of the Court's contribution to efficient but fair justice 
and to economic growth with enhanced productivity. Indeed, it 
will determine how successfully the Court can fulfill the 
constitutional goal of maximizing, as Justice O'Connor said in 
Kolender v. Lawson, "individual freedoms within a framework of 
ordered liberty. " 3 
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3 Kolender v. Lawson, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1858 (1983). 
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I. FACTS AND HISTORY REGARDING SUPREME COURT CASELOAD 
A. Statistical Analysis 
The increasing burden of the Supreme Court's workload is 
5 
amply demonstrated by various statistical analyses cited by the 
Justices themselves. 7 The Chief Justice, for example, recently 
noted that in 1953, the first year of Chief Justice Warren's 
tenure, the Court had 1,463 cases on its docket and issued 65 
signed opinions. 8 In the Term ending July 1982, the Supreme 
Court had 5,311 cases on its docket and issued 141 signed Court 
opinions. 9 This amounts to a docket increase of 270 percent 
7 Justice Brennan recently noted that during the 1981 Term, 
the Supreme Court granted review in 210 cases, which is 26 more 
than the Term before and 56 more than two Terms ago." Brennan, 
Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court's Workload, 66 Judicature 230, 
illllllllmtS: 
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the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation & the National 
Conference of Bar Presidents, at 7 (Feb. 6, 1983) hereinafter 
cited as Comments of Justice O'Connor] (available in files of 
Fordham Law Review). 
8 Annual Report, supra note 1. at 42. "Signed" opinions do 
not include concurring, dissenting or per curiam opinions. Id. at 
443 n.l; see infra note 17. 
aiLitit••····-· 
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and more than a doubling of signed opinions. 10 In the Term 
ending July 6 1983, the Court issued 151 signed opinions. ~; 
During Chief Justice Burger's tenure, Congress has created 
over one hundred new statutory causes of action. 12 The Court 
itself, although to a lesser extent, has also created new causes 
12 Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1983, at A12, col. 1. 
7 
of action. 13 Further evidence of the growing litigiousness of 
the American public lies in the number of licensed attorneys, 
which has almost doubled since the earl 1970s, and the number of 
federal judges, which has increased over the past 30 years from 
279 to 647. 14 It is these attorneys and judges who "produce 
the 
grist for the Supreme Court 'mill'," 15 yet the number of 
Supreme 
Court Justices has remained at nine since 1869. 16 
14 Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1983, at A12, col. 1. 
15 Annual Report, supra note 1, at 443. 
16 Comments of Justice 0' Connor, supra note 7, at 4. 
--·---.. 111,ltl 
8 
Other statistics, not as commonly cited, tell a different 
story. There actually has not been an increase over the long 
term in the total number of opinions of the Court. In 1882, for 
example, there were 260; in 1932, there were 168; and in 1982, 
there were 151. 17 There has been a dramatic increase, however, 
in the number of concurring opinions-4 in 1882, 4 in 1932, and 70 
in 1982; and the number of dissenting opinions-17 in 1882, 24 in 
1932, and 144 in 1982. 18 Stated another way, in 1882, there 
were 242 unanimous decisions (93.08 percent of the total); in 
1932, there were 133 (79.64 percent of the total); and in 1982, 
17 See Appendix, Chart I. (found at ~- Ford. L. Rev~- ( _ 
_ ,.,,. 
r.-. .. --.. ,.. 
18 See Appendix. Chart I. (found at 
9 
there were 34 (22.52 percent of the total). 19 Since the advent 
of the Warren Court in 1953, the total number of opinions per 
Term, including concurring and dissenting opinions, has risen 
from 138 to 361. 20 Dissension among the Justices contributes 
to the workload problem not only by spawning separate opinions 
but also by inspiring prospective litigants to seek to catapult 
concurring or dissenting views into majority opinions. 
B. History of Reform 
Concern over the Court's workload is as old as the Court 
19 See Appendix, Chart I. (found at ????????) 
10 
itself. Soon after the Judiciary Act of 1789 21 established a 
six-Justice Supreme Court, thirteen single-judge district courts, 
and three circuit courts, consisting of one district judge and 
two Supreme Court Justices "riding circuit" 22 it became 
apparent 
that the Court's workload was overwhelming. 
~~::::,:::~~:~~:9E:ffi~&:::::::1B§::::::::p,1~::]:~~®!2;J.i~a£~:::::::1;::::::·!a:::,:::2,e1:!~:. ~::::]:;:p;,99¥,~8n, r,:::::::::~1n1!£1]:,:1 
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21 Ch. 20. 1 Stat. 73. 
11 
Congress' response in subsequent years was to eliminate the 
circuit riding duties and increase the size of the Supreme 
Court. 24 In 1891, Congress established nine circuit courts of 
appeals and did away with the mandatory right of appeal in some 
subject areas by introducing the concept of discretionary review 
by writ of certiorari. 25 Mandatory review was retained in 
12 
only 
clearly defined areas. 26 Nevertheless, by the 1923 Term the 
Supreme Court was more than one year behind in its docket. 27 
This delay was intolerable to Chief Justice Taft, who sponsored a 
committee of Justices to draft legislative reforms. 28 With 
uncharacteristic speed and without the modern 
congressional tendency to engage in "elegant variation," Congress 
adopted the Justices draft in the Judges' Bill of 1925. 29 The 
26 See supra note 24. 
27 Frankfurter & Landis. The Business of the Supreme Court of 
the United States-A Study in the Federal Judicial System, 40 
~i:ii:1 ::::::::~:~!{;ii:i:@~l:;, :~::P:§:i:lgru¥~i~::::::::~fi~:1:~~Y.ll llllllllllllllllllll~l:::rn&1:~ 
,_ •• ,, .... 
28 F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, supra note 22, at 259-60; see 
Blumstein. The Supreme Court's Jurisdiction-Reform Proposals, 
Discretionary Review, and Writ Dismissals, 26 Vand. L,. Rev. 895, 
898-99 ( 197 3). 
29 Ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936. 
13 
bill further narrowed the mandatory jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court to a few categories, including appeals from federal court 
decisions holding state statutes unconstitutional or invalid 
under federal law or treaties, and state court decisions 
upholding state statutes against federal constitutional 
attack. 30 The framework established by the Judges' Bill of 1925 
persists today, giving the Supreme Court great flexibility in 
choosing its cases for review. For, instead of narrowing the 
Court's jurisdiction, Congress chose, in more and more instances, 
to delegate to the Court the responsibility for determining which 
federal issues are of sufficient national importance to warrant 
14 
Supreme Court review. 31 The process of issue selection, 
therefore, has become an increasingly crucial part of the review 
function. 
31 See Blumstein, supra note 28, at 903. See supra notes 
25-30 and accompanying text. 
15 
The rising case load, nevertheless, has continued to stimulate 
discussion. 34 In 1971, the Chief Justice appointed a 
seven-member study committee chaired by Professor Paul Freund of 
the Harvard Law School. The Freund Committee recommended the 
establishment of a National Court of Appeals to screen all 
certiorari petitions and appeals, referring approximately 400 to 
the Supreme Court and denying the rest. 35 Of the cases 
referred to it, the Supreme Court would decide either to grant or 
deny certiorari, or to remand the case to the National Court of 
Appeals for decision. 3 6 If the National Court of Appeals did 
35 Federal Judicial Center, Report of the Study Group on the 
Caseload of the Supreme Court 47 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 
Report of the Study Group]. See Freund, A National Court of 
Appeals, 25 Hastings L.J. 1301, 1305-09 (1974). 
16 
not refer a case to the Supreme Court, there would be no 
procedure by which the Court could review such a decision. Thus, 
had this proposal been adopted, many issues would never have come 
to the attention of the Supreme Court in any form, and the choice 
of factual context in which the issues presented to the Court 
are reviewed would have been severely restricted. 
In 1972, Congress established a commission headed by Roman 
Hruska. This commission also recommended the establishment of a 
National Court of Appeals. 37 This proposed National Court, 
however, would not have screened certiorari petitions, but rather 
would have heard cases referred to it by the Supreme Court or 
transferred to it by a court of appeals. 38 The Supreme Court 
would thus have been forced to expend its time reviewing which 
cases should go to the National Court of Appeals. The Freund and 
Hruska proposals generated a flurry of scholarly comment, both 
37 Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate 
System,Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for 
Change 5,30 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Recommendations for 
Change]. 
38 ~at 32. 
17 
!;~~:~£I!::::::::M4was made by the Chief Justice at the American Bar 
39 See. e.g., A. Bickel. The Caseload of the Supreme Court and 
What, If Anything to do About It (1973): Black, The National 
Court of Appeals: An Unwise Proposal, 83 Yale L.J. 883 (1974); 
Brennan II, supra note 9; Freund, Why We Need a National Court of 
Appeals. 59 A.B.A.J. 247 (1973); Gressman, supra note 27; Warren & 
Burger. Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice Burger 
Defends Freund Study Group's Composition and Proposal, 59 A.B.A.J. 
721 (1973); Composition, Constitutionality, and Desirability, supra 
note 9. 
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Association meeting in New Orleans in February of 1983. The 
Chief Justice advocates, as an interim step, the establishment of 
a five-year temporary special panel of the new United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The special panel 
would have the narrow jurisdiction to decide all inter-circuit 
conflicts. 43 Two judges would be designated from each circuit, 
creating a pool of twenty-six judges. A panel of seven to nine 
judges ould be drawn from the pool for six months to a year to 
hear and decide all inter-circuit conflicts and, possibly, a 
defined category of statutory interpretation cases. The panel 
could remove 35 to 50 cases a year from the argument calendar of 
the Supreme Court, which would, however, retain certiorari 
jurisdiction over these cases. 44 The Chief Justice views his 
43 Annual Report. supra note 1, at 447. 
19 
proposal as only an interim and partial solution and, therefore, 
further consideration of a permanent national Court of Appeals is 
not entirely moot. 
In addition to proposals for reform, the Supreme Court has 
attempted to alleviate its workload over the last two decades 
through self-help measures. These include shortening the time 
for oral argument to half an hour: assigning additional law 
clerks to the Justices: dispensing with records on petitions for 
certiorari; and, in some cases, pooling law clerk resources. 45 
Despite these efforts, the workload problem persists. 
In recent months, most of the Associate Justices have begun to 
speak out on the workload problem, offering a variety of 
solutions [ .] e1::,::::!.n~:::::::1:e:11±.&l%nit::::~1,1g:~2;~::~: 
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Reforms recommended by the Justices and others fall into three 
general categories: delegation of Supreme Court authority to 
another court to select or decide cases, 61 further statutory 
limitations on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or on 
~····~ 
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61 See Annual Report, supra note 1 at 447; Stevens II, supra 
note 47,at 182; Recommendations for Change, supra note 37, at 
30-39; Report of the Study Group, supra note 35, at 47. 
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federal courts in general, 62 and the exercise of greater 
judicial restraint and discipline by the Supreme Court itself in 
its selection of issues for review. 63 All three approaches 
merit serious study and debate. Emphasis, however, 
should be placed on the third, with the addition of a fourth that 
will be advanced with great temerity at the end of this Article. 
64 The pref erred approaches would concentrate on the 
fulfillment of the Supreme Court's constitutional mandate to 
construct a legal consensus on a few issues of fundamental 
national significance. 
62 See Powell, supra note 7, at 1371-72; Comments of 
Justice O'Connor, supra note 7, at 141; Remarks of Justice 
Rehnquist, supra note 10 at 30. 
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II. ANALYSIS 
A. Proposals for an Intermediary Court 
Delegation of the Supreme Court's case selection authority to an 
intermediary super court of appeals seems contrary to the 
Constitution's provision for "one supreme Court." 65 
Constitutional considerations apart, however, delegation of the 
Supreme Court's power to screen cases would significantly alter 
the function of the Supreme Court in shaping constitutional law. 
The power to select cases is a fundamental part of the power to 
define the issues and trends in the development of constitutional 
and statutory interpretation. 66 
Life-tenured Supreme Court Justices bring to the issue-selection 
process a variety of backgrounds-judicial, political, and 
65 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; see Black, supra note 39, at 
885-87. 
~1~11!;:~~~~~~~ 
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academic67-an experienced ear attuned to monitoring the 
heartbeat of a living Constitution, and a reasoned interaction of 
diverse philosophies and interests. M Because most Justices are 
assimilated gradually during extended intervals, the Court 
provides continuity, knowledge of trends, and collective 
perspective that simply could not be replicated in a panel of 
rotating judges with more limited functions and purposes. R In 
selecting cases for review, Justices must weigh not only the 
importance of the issues presented, but the timeliness of their 
review, the appropriateness of the factual context in which they 
arise, the adequacy of representation by counsel, the likely 
views of the other Justices on the merits, the reasons why on 
67 See infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
1•1•lllJlll1~1 
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previous occasions they may have avoided the issues, and the 
relationship of the issues presented to issues in other pending 
cases and doctrinal developments. ?~ 
28 
The selection of the appropriate time and factual context in 
which to address-or readdress-an issue of constitutional or 
societal importance is uniquely a function of the Supreme Court. 
The decision to grant the petition for certiorari in Baker v. 
Carr 72would not inevitably have been the choice of an 
:::]':]:]:]::11::.t#:::1::::::]~E~p,;~1~t:::±m=:::paiie?;~ J~8F::~:::::::,1 ::::H~1~ .. J~:e:·:~ :t.:: 
72 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
29 
intermediary super court of appeals, given the Supreme Court's 
clear direction in Colegrove v. Green 73 that legislative 
apportionment was a political matter beyond the province of the 
Court. 74 Nor is it clear whether an intermediary supercourt of 
appeals would have considered the question of school 
desegregation in Brown v. Board of Education75 worthy of the 
Supreme Court's attention, or whether the doctrine of "separate 
but equal" in Plessy v. Ferguson76 would have resolved the 
matter conclusively. Moreover, three years after the Court had 
held in Rummel v. Estelle77 that the eighth amendment's 
prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" could not be 
invoked to shorten the length of a sentence, it is equally 
doubtful that an intermediary court would have thought the Court 
would again be interested in reviewing the sentence issue. In 
73 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
74 Id. at 552; see Black, supra note 39, at 889-91. 
75 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
76 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
77 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
30 
Solem v. Helm, 7 8 however, the Court held that the eighth 
amendment proscribes a life sentence without the possibility of 
parole for a seventh nonviolent felony. 79 
78 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983). 
79 Id. at 3013, 3016 • 
. s·:=~::::,~:::::::::::~::~:d=]::e.:~-3, .. ::]~rn;.~ e::):::::t: 
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Efforts to restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by 
statute or to delegate specific issues for final resolution by an 
inferior court-either a permanent new court or a rotating panel 
32 
of judges-present additional public policy problems. D.t#!igiF!i6.9Y.$$. 
:-:·:·:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·: 
misapprehend the unique function that the Supreme Court plays in 
our constitutional democracy. M The Supreme Court is not the 
final court of errors and appeals. In the words of the Freund 
Committee: 
The case which it is the primary duty of the Court to decide are 
those that, by hypothesis. present the most fundamental and 
difficult issues of law and judgment •••• To maintain the 
constitutional order the Court must decide controversies that 
111• 
33 
have sharply divided legislators, lawyers, and the public. And 
in deciding, the Court must strive to understand and elucidate 
the complexities of the issues, to give direction to the law, and 
to be as precise, persuasive, and invulnerable as possible in its 
exposition. 86 
The issue is not whether there should be limitations on access to 
the Supreme Court; obviously there must be. l!]JlMl~JjjjjjJg9U@iffiJ:::jJ#.~ 
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however need not foreclose its power to make important judgments 
in certain jurisdictional areas. Rather, it should retain the 
discretion to choose the issues worthy of its review in the 
broadest possible jurisdictional environment. a :-::::·1:e!®liem:::::::111w:p, 
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8 6 Report of the Study Group, supra note 35 at 1. 
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workload problem is needed, however, which both preserves and 
enhances the ability of the Court to perform its core 
constitutional responsibilities. 
B. An Alternative Proposal 
The Supreme Court must be freed from the illusion that it has a 
duty to correct every error and resolve every conflict. At the 
same time, the Court needs to identify and resolve legal issues 
of fundamental national significance in a clear and consistent 
manner. The proposal outlined below achieves these goals and 
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consists of four interrelated parts. 
(1) The Supreme Court's remaining mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction should be limited to constitutional cases in which 
fundamental human rights raising an issue of nationwide 
divisiveness are involved. 87 The Court should be the guardian 
of its docket and not be forced by statute to take for argument 
and decision any case which it otherwise would determine is not 
of prime national importance. 
(2) Conflicts among the circuit courts that do not involve issues 
worthy of Supreme Court review should be resolved by the affected 
circuits without any involvement of the Court. 
(3) The Supreme Court should be highly selective in choosing for 
review only issues of fundamental national significance. 
(4) The Supreme Court should reduce the pressure on its caseload 
by discouraging unnecessary litigation (and invitations to 
87 Rather than completely eliminating mandatory 
jurisdiction, it is preferable to limit it to narrower 
circumstances. See American Law Division (Congressional Research 
Service) Report on Mandatory Appellate Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court of the United States 62 (Preliminary Draft June 18, 
1982) (available in files of Fordham Law Review). 
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unfocused arguments on the part of the bar) through the exercise 
of greater judicial restraint, collegial deference, and 
disciplined opinion writing by the Justices. 
The first and second parts of the proposal are intended to reduce 
the flow of cases that the Supreme Court now feels obligated to 
review even though they do not involve issues of prime national 
importance. 
1. Reducing the Number of Cases Presented for Review 
It has been estimated that mandatory appeals constitute about 25 
percent of the Court' s caseload. 88 Enactment of H. R. 19 6 889 and 
S.645 90 would replace the Court's remaining mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction with discretionary review, thus reducing the number 
of cases the Court must review each year. Elimination of 
mandatory jurisdiction, except in truly rare situations, is 
89 H.R. 1968, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
90 S. 645, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1983) • 
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ii necessary·=== to complete the conversion of the Supreme Court-
started by the Act of 189192 and accelerated by the Judges' Bill 
of 192593-from a final court of errors and appeals to the 
ultimate judicial authority on issues of fundamental national 
significance. The one exception to the total elimination of 
mandatory jurisdiction, necessary to preserve the core 
constitutional responsibility of the Court, would be to mandate 
review of those cases in which a lower court has upheld the 
constitutionality of a state or federal statute denying 
fundamental human rights of a truly divisive national character. 
Because the Supreme Court is the ultimate vindicator of such 
rights under the Constitution, it would not be consistent with 
the Court's constitutional responsibility to avoid such issues 
92 Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 
826. 
93 Ch. 229, 43 Stat 936. 
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2. Alternatives for Resolving Inter-Circuit Conflicts 
The second part of the proposal also reduces the number of cases 
that require Supreme Court review. It simply is not necessary, 
in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities for the 
Supreme Court to act as an arbitrator among conflicting circuit 
courts unless the issues are of fundamental national 
significance. Justice O'Connor has estimated that 23.7 percent 
of the Supreme Court's decided cases during her first term 
involved "interpretation[s] of statutes on which the lower courts 
95 Comments of Justice O'Connor, supra note 7, at 13. 
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that another mechanism is needed to resolve these conflicts. 
Suggested mechanisms range from the Chief Justice's proposal for 
a temporary national panel98 to Justice White's proposal for a 
mandatory en bane hearing. 99 
The approach suggested in this Article is a variation on these 
proposals, which is designed to augment the underlying theme of 
these reforms: the resolution of legal conflict through 
::rr::r=:r:r::::,~: msa~$l ~:~::t::::::::1:~ :110~rna~:::::::sffi!tllffil.:]mllffi:1ru:11::]~:1::::::::.&,~::::::::1M1,:~:.:,t:,i:l]:J:]::11:Jt]]e,±: ::~:::!:~:~! :;::::!: 
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98 See Annual Report, supra note 1, at 447. 
99 See Brennan I, supra note 7, at 232 (quoting Justice 
----~1-
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collegial reason and the search for consensus. Whenever a 
circuit renders a decision that is in conflict with a prior 
decision of another circuit, the losing party should be allowed 
to petition the court issuing the conflicting opinion for a 
rehearing before a panel of seven judges, three from each of the 
to circuits which gave rise to the conflict, and a seventh to be 
assigned from another circuit by the Chief Justice • 100 Judges 
from the two circuits in conflict thus would participate in an en 
bane rehearing to resolve the conflict. 101 The decision of the 
en bane panel would constitute binding precedent on all circuits, 
subject only to discretionary review by the Supreme Court if an 
issue of fundamental national importance is presented. Should a 
third circuit fail to follow the precedent established by the 
100 The Chief Justice is authorized to "assign temporarily 
any circuit judge to act as circuit judge in another circuit." 28 
U.S.C. § 29l(a) (1976). 
101 Circuit judges are authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) 
(1976) to sit en bane within a single circuit, but the statute 
makes no reference to inter-circuit en bane hearings. Hence. 
legislation would be required to effect this portion of the 
proposal. 
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inter-circuit en bane hearing, 102 the petitioner could request 
an en bane hearing by seven judges, two from each of the three 
circuits that had addressed the issue and one assigned by the 
102 The decision of the inter-circuit en bane court would be 
binding precedent for all other circuits. It is therefore hoped 
that the need for the further procedure set forth above would be 
rare indeed. 
ltJJlftllllllllrE 
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The long-term effect of bringing the differing circuit judges 
together would be a greater respect on the part of federal 
appellate judges for the precedents of other circuits. Indeed, 
such respect should be encouraged by the Supreme Court through 
its rules and decisions. There are no inherent geographic or 
political reasons why federal judges in the thirteen circuits 
should apply federal statutes differently in response to local 
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circumstances • 10 4 The argument that circuit conflicts help 
sharpen the issues for Supreme Court review or provide a testing 
ground for various interpretations is, in a word, foolish. In 
any event, such an argument is far outweighed by the injustice, 
chaos, and burden of litigation caused by conflicting statutory 
These two proposals--if the earlier cited estimates of conflict 
104 See Schaefer, supra note 96, at 454. 
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and mandatory jurisdiction cases are correct-could reduce the 
number of cases argued before the Court by up to 4 7 percent. 107 
3. Concentrating Supreme Court Decision-Making 
The third suggestion is, in large measure, an acknowledgment of 
what has become a reality. Since Congress enacted the Judges 
Bill of 1925, 108 the Supreme Court has not been expected to take 
on the "function ••• of primarily-or even largely-correcting 
errors committed by other courts. " 109 The value of Supreme 
Court decision making is not in how many individual disputes are 
resolved, but rather in the clarity and cohesiveness of the legal 
guidance it provides the highest courts of the various states, 
the lower federal and state courts and the political branches of 
government. 
107 See supra notes 88, 95 and accompanying text (25% of the 
caseload are cases arising out of mandatory jurisdiction and 
23.7% involve inter-circuit conflicts). 
108 Ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936. 
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As Congress reacts to media events and special interest pleas, 
and as the executive branch is consumed by "crisis-coping" and 
"fire-fighting", the importance of a third and independent 
branch, committed to reflective reasoning and to a rational 
search for sometimes elusive constitutional values increases. As 
Justice Holmes once said: 
"The best defense for leaving fundamental responsibilities to 
this Court came from Brandeis • • • that constitutional 
restrictions enable a man to sleep at night and know that he 
won't be robbed before morning--which, in days of legislative 
activity and general scheming, otherwise, he scarcely would feel 
sure about. 110 
110 Letter from o.w. Holmes to Felix Frankfurter, Holmes 
Papers, Harvard Law School (April 20, 1921) (quoted in A. Bickel, 
The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 28 (1970)) 
[hereinafter cited as A. Bickel I]. 
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No Plimsoll line can be established which helps the Court to 
discharge its difficult responsibilities. With many of the 
issues with which it deals-for example, due process, just 
compensation, equal protection-the Court is left with the need 
for intuitive judgment. According to Justice Powell, however, 
simply coping with the rising caseload may require a Justice 
during the busy opinion writing months of May and June to work 
"twelve to fifteen hours a day, six days [a] week." 116 Such a 
schedule simply is not conducive to quiet reflection or sound 
;:w;;;;::==~=-* 
116 Powell, supra note 7, at 1372 
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judgment. 117 The answer is not to relegate the Justices like 
too man senators and cabinet officers, to the role of mangers of 
an ever-expanding staff • 118 Rather, the Court should limit the 
number of cases that it decides on the merits each year to a 
manageable number, allowing sufficient time for discussion, 
common sense,reflection and clarity of presentation. As Justice 
Stevens has noted, the Supreme Court's caseload could be reduced 
significantly by stricter adherence to the doctrine of judicial 
restraint. 119 Very simply, if it is not necessary to decide the 
issue-if the issue is not ripe for review-the Court should not 
undertake to decide it, for as Alexander Bickel said, "[n]o 
117 Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Forward: The Time 
Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 99-100 (1959). 
118 Justice Brandeis once observed: "The reason the public 
thinks so much of the Justices of the Supreme Court is that they 
are almost the only people in Washington who do their own work." 
C. Wyzanski, Whereas-A Judge's Premises 61 (1965) (remark of 
Justice Brandeis) (quoted in Remarks of Justice Rehnquist, supra 
note 10, at 27). 
119 Stevens II, supra note 47, at 180; see Ashwander v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341, 345-48 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J. concurring). 
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answer is what the wrong question begets." 120 ~q~iti~::::::: ;~~~;;,,,.::::~~~~~ 
120 A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 103 (1962). 
50 
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Another type of case that the Supreme Court need not review 
involves issues limited to a specific geographical area. !$f!j'.jjj!! !eE 
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Cases which are factually unique also need not be reviewed. $ii 
53 
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should be a uniquely crafted work of art; even the dissenting 
views, like contrasting colors and off-setting shadows, should 
contribute to the clarity and vitality of the whole. It is 
hoped the Court's archetypes wuould tend more toward the harmony 
of Monet and clarity of Rembrandt than the harried spontaneity of 
Pollock or discordance of Kandinsky. 
4. Collegial Analsis: Reaching a Consensus 
The most significant opportunity to reduce the Supreme Court's 
caseload may ultimately be through disciplined opinion writing 
and collegial deference in the rendering of decisions. In 
selecting cases for review, the Court should consider whether 
members of the Court are prepared to work together to clarify and 
~a::t:::J]$,l:::::::,2:1:1: g:2~::1:::::::::::!::!:1~¥~1~::t,::::::::1::t:::i::::::::1m:~fi!:~n1:¥§1~::::]::~ :~§filn§!~~::::::::1mm11~1~::=:t,:, 
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advance the state of the law. The subtle judgments and mutual 
deference involved in this process spring from the Court's deeply 
embedded traditions and the pract ical wisdom of its finest 
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The unpublished opinions of Justice Brandeis, as analyzed by 
Alexander Bickel, provide useful insight into the collegial 
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decision-making of past Courts and the judgment involved in 
deciding whether to dissent. 137 Brandeis had been assigned to 
write the Court's opinion in St. Louis Iron Mountain Southern 
Railway Co. v. Starbird, 138 concerning the question whether the 
Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review a state court's decision 
if a federal right had not been expressly asserted in the state 
court below. Brandeis wrote a draft opinion denying 
jurisdiction, but several months later Justice Day issued a 
unanimous opinion for the Court finding jurisdiction and 
addressing the merits. Why did Brandeis not dissent? Bickel 
asserts that Brandeis "suppressed his dissenting views on 
questions which he considered to be of no great consequence." 139 
137 See A. Bickel, The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice 
Brandeis passim (1957)[hereinafter cited as A. Bickel II]. 
138 243 U.S. 592 (1917). 
139 A. Bickel II, supra note 137, at 28. 
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"suppressed dissents for tactical 
reasons" 143 and often "referred to Holmes' reluctance to dissent 
58 
again after he had once had his say on a subject. 144 The Court 
has often performed magnificently in adjusting the views of its 
members to avoid dissension on great public issues, particularly 
when unanimity was important to gain public acceptance. The 
nation should greatly admire and appreciate the effort, time and 
talent which was expended in fashioning a single Court opinion 
in, inter alia, Brown v. Board of Education,~ Brown v. Board 
of Education II, 146 Cooper v. Aaron, 147 Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 148 United States v. Nixon, 149 
and in achieving near-unanimity (8-1) in Bob Jones University v. 
1:2:::-:::.#ffim!#i[·:¥f:liffiili]ifil!ffi.#!i!li·:: :·::t,::::t:::t,:: 
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144 A. Bickel II, supra note 137, at 18. 
146 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
147 358 U.S. 1 (1959). 
1 48 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
149 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
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United States. 150 
While these cases demonstrate that the Court sometimes has 
struggled mightily for consensus, there is little public 
indication that the traditional spirit of collegial deference 
pervades the Court today. 
150 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). 
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The Court, however, must confront "that 'great difficulty of all 
group action'-when to dissent, and when to concede and be 
silent. " 154 While concurring opinions may contribute to the 
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views and lack of cohesion erode the Court's moral authority, 
befuddle the beneficiaries of its guidance, and-most relevant 
here- invite further pressure on its workload. 
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Perhaps the classic example of fragmentation occurred in Regents 
of the University of Califorllia v. Bakke. 18 5 To different 
five-to-four majorities decided the two main issues in the 
case, 186 resulting in six separate opinions. 187 Even though 
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185 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
1: .--tllP•mr~ 
187 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978) Opinion of Powell. J •• at 269; opinion of Brennan, J., 
Marshall, J., White, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, at 324; opinion of White, J., at 379; opinion 
of Marshall. J •• at 387; opinion of Blackmun, J., at 402; opinion 
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Justices Marshall, White and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan in 
his opinion, they each also wrote their on separate opinions. 188 
The resultant 156 pages left the law regarding affirmative action 
in medical school admissions in a state of reasoned ambiguity. 
of Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, at 
408) • 
188 See supra note 187. 
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There are, of course, times when a clear and forceful dissent 
contribute greatly to public understanding of the law. but 
d i ssents should be saved for such occasions. One should not 
advocate that the fiercely independent intellects that constitute 
toda's Supreme Court consign themselves to the lowest common 
denominator of compromise. Nor should attempts at accommodation 
resort to intentional ambiguities like the legislative 
ambiguities created by House-Senate conferences. If clarity and 
candor are best served by dissenting opinions, then a dissent is 
preferabl e to d i s i ngenuous accommodation. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is truly ironic for one who feels so deeply that the Court has 
consistently discharged its constitutional responsibility with 
more judgment, style and foresight than any other institution of 
government to suggest any criticism whatsoever. When the 
President and Congress avoided the issues, the Court had the 
courage and foresight to end racial segregation in the public 
school system, to come to grips with the right of a woman to have 
an abortion, to recognize that sex discrimination is unacceptable 
in a consti tut ional democracy, and to insist upon a fair criminal 
process. Anyone who knows Ameri can history must concede that the 
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Court has performed with a higher standard of excellence than any 
other institution, state or federal, in this constitutional 
democracy. The libraries at Oxford, Cambridge and Harvard 
undoubtedly contain more critical theses about Shakespeare or 
Pushkin than any minor writers or poets; the Court must accept 
the fact that institutions that excel are the subject of 
continuing critical pressure to attain even greater standards of 
excellence-perhaps because they are the repository of so many of 
civilized society's aspirations. In that spirit this conclusion 
is written. 
Much of the answer to the workload problem lies not in the 
establishment of new institutions but deep in the traditions of 
the Supreme Court. Congress should give the Court discretion to 
choose only those few issues of fundamental national importance 
for review, delegating to the circuit courts the power to resolve 
lesser conflicts. Like a microcosm of the larger society it 
reflects, the Supreme Court's success depends on it taking those 
limited issues and weaving the diverse strands of a complex 
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society into a cohesive fabric. Thus, the ultimate objective in 
the management of the Supreme Court's caseload should be to 
provide the Justices with the freedom to grapple together as 
wise individualists in search of common principles rooted in the 
unfulfilled vision of our Constitution. It is a disciplined 
search which cautions against needless dissent and pointless 
contention. As Alexander Biekel has said, society "values the 
capacity of the judges to draw its attention to issues of largest 
principle that may have gone unheeded in the welter of its 
pragmatic doings • 199 
199 A. Bickel, supra note 110, at 177. 
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